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Uncertainty . . . is the only certainty there is, and knowing how to live with insecurity is the only security.
John Allen Paulos

1

This Article examines the symbiotic relationship between copyright law and
technology. I describe how an environment characterized by rapid technological
change creates two conditions that determine the direction and evolution of
copyright law: legal delay and legal uncertainty. I explain how uncertainty
over the application of existing copyright law to newly emerging technology
catalyzes the actions of copyright owners and users. I argue that uncertainty
and delay (1) have an enabling effect on anticopyright sentiments, (2) lead to a
greater reliance on self-help efforts by content providers and users, and (3) induce legislative involvement in copyright law. In the final Part of this Article,
I consider how the framework of technological uncertainty and delay helps to
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explain a number of emerging issues in copyright law. I conclude by providing
normative proposals for copyright reform. These proposals relate to the choice
between standards and rules, as well as the role of courts, legislators, and administrative agencies in the development of copyright law.
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INTRODUCTION
Judging from the headlines, it appears that copyright law is in an
2
existential crisis. Broadband networks and digital applications have
widely expanded unlicensed access to copyrighted content. Consumerto-consumer dissemination over file-sharing networks increasingly bypasses traditional segments of the copyright market. Despite the de3
ployment of a wide array of scare tactics, professional distributors have
4
failed thus far to reverse file sharing and copyright circumvention.
2

This Article focuses on United States copyright law, although the analysis may be
generalized to international laws affecting copyright. Reference is made for illustrative
purposes as appropriate.
3
Publishers and entertainment representatives have launched a frontal assault on
new dissemination technologies to preserve their existing business models. For instance,
the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) has pushed for legislation that
increases copyright enforcement related to emerging technologies. See, e.g., Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2004, H.R. 4077, 108th Cong. (2004) (enhancing copyright enforcement and public education about copyrights and the Internet); Author,
Consumer, and Computer Owner Protection and Security (ACCOPS) Act of 2003, H.R.
2752, 108th Cong. (2003) (extending domestic and international copyright enforcement); Piracy Deterrence and Education Act of 2003, H.R. 2517, 108th Cong. (2003) (including many of the provisions of H.R. 4077 and also clarifying the government’s authority to seize pirated work). In addition, the RIAA has filed lawsuits against technology
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Two paradigms exist to analyze the existential crisis facing copyright law: the political-economy model and the technological paradigm. In the political-economy model, the death of copyright law is
caused by legislative and judicial capture by copyright owners, which
negates the original, true meaning of copyright law. The technological paradigm argues that digital technology has rendered copyright
law hopelessly obsolete or, from the entertainment industry’s view5
point, dangerously ineffective. Commentators argue that “digital
copyright” requires a type of governance different from the historical
6
straitjacket of copyright law. Interested parties disagree on the appropriate direction of copyright law: namely, does new technology
require a stronger legal hold on copyrighted content or does digital
technology present an opportunity to release cultural goods from the
shackles of copyright law?

producers, see, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 646 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting “the recording industry’s anxiety about file-sharing”); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Plaintiffs claim Napster users are engaged in
the wholesale reproduction and distribution of copyrighted works, all constituting direct
infringement.”); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d
1029, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (“Plaintiffs argue that Defendants are liable for both contributory and vicarious copyright infringement.”), aff ’d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004),
vacated, 545 U.S. 913 (2005), Internet service providers, see, e.g., In re Verizon Internet
Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 24, 26 (D.D.C. 2003) (noting that the RIAA was seeking enforcement of subpoenas demanding the identities of copyright infringers), rev’d, 351 F.3d
1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003), and end users of peer-to-peer networks, see infra Part I. For an
overview, see LexisNexis, Recording Industry Association of America Case Activity from
Lexis/Nexis Courtlink, http://www.lexisnexis.com/trial/nalm100181clinkriaa.asp (last
visited Apr. 15, 2009).
4
Consider in this respect research data from the NPD Group showing that the
number of people downloading music illegally surged a month after recording companies began suing hundreds of music fans. See Press Release, NPD Group, Peer-toPeer Digital Video Downloading Outpacing Legal Alternatives Five to One (Dec. 20,
2006), available at http://www.npd.com/press/releases/press_061220.html. For more
on the mixed results of these studies, see infra Part II.
5
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (No. 04-0480)
(“Unless [developers of file-sharing software] can be held accountable, copyright will
soon mean nothing on the Internet, and the incentives on which our copyright system
rests will be imperiled.”).
6
See, e.g., John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 84 (discussing the obsolescence of intellectual property law in the digital world); Jessica Litman,
Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19, 39 (1996) (“We can
continue to write copyright laws that only copyright lawyers can decipher . . . or we can
contrive a legal structure that ordinary individuals can learn . . . .”). See generally Tom
W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 750 (2001) (“[C]lumsy attempts to legislatively amplify common law rights threaten to . . . do more harm than good.”).
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With every court decision or appeal to Congress, the debate over
7
the proper adjustment of copyright law becomes further polarized.
At one end, we find the entertainment industry, while on the other
end we have consumers, scholars, and civil libertarians. The former
argues that the entertainment industry will not survive unless intellectual property laws are strengthened to meet the threat of new tech8
nologies and the widespread theft that occurs over the Internet. The
latter maintain that new technology presents opportunities for unprecedented cultural exchange, suggesting that existing legal and institutional arrangements reduce economic welfare by strangling tech9
nological progress. At regular intervals, both sides present their

7

See, e.g., H.R. 5211, 107th Cong. sec. 1, § 514(d)(1) (2002) (exempting antipiracy devices from liability where damage to a user’s computer is $250 or less); see also
Declan McCullagh, Could Hollywood Hack Your PC?, CNET NEWS, July 23, 2002,
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-945923.html?tag=fd_lede (quoting an attorney from
the Electronic Frontier Foundation as saying that H.R. 5211 is “part of a greater strategy that’s being implemented by the entertainment industry to lock up and control
digital information”).
8
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th
Cir. 2004), vacated, 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (“From the advent of the player piano, every
new means of reproducing sound has struck a dissonant chord with musical copyright
owners, often resulting in federal litigation.”).
9
One argument in support of this claim is that modern communication tools enable the dissemination of content without significant capital investments and that the
economic rationale for copyright’s bias towards publishers and distributors is outdated.
See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 37-38
(2004) (arguing that new distributors may be able to harness digital distribution and
pay a higher percentage of proceeds to artists). Based on the assumption that digital
sharing of music is a superior distribution mechanism, there have been several proposals to amend the traditional licensing model of copyright. Many commentators would
replace the traditional proprietary licensing model with commons or pooling arrangements on the basis of mandatory levies or blanket fees. See, e.g., WILLIAM W.
FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP 199-258 (2004) (arguing for a “governmentallyadministered reward system” for copyright holders); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 263, 313 (2002) (arguing that artists could be compensated through statutory
levies on Internet service subscriptions and on the sales of computer, audio, and video
equipment); Litman, supra note 9, at 41-50 (proposing blanket fees or levies, digital
rights management, and an opt-out mechanism for copyright); Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 673, 704-16 (2003) (arguing
for a market-based solution to the problem of copyright licensing); Glynn S. Lunney,
Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 852-53 (2001) (suggesting a levy on sales of equipment and blank storage media while authorizing private copying); Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 1 (2003) (making the case for governmental use levies to force individuals
to effectively pay for the right to copy and distribute copyrighted works).
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10

arguments before the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, the copyright tug
11
of war attains iconoclastic dimensions.
As this description of current events illustrates, copyright law is
12
greatly influenced by technological change. Whenever technological
advances create new means of making copies or communicating copyrighted works, difficult questions arise as to how boundaries should be
13
drawn around new uses of content created by the new technology.

10

See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (holding that the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998), is constitutional); N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (concluding that newspapers cannot license individual articles to databases without a transfer of copyright). The Supreme
Court recently declined to hear an appeal by the RIAA regarding subpoenas of Internet
service providers in In re Verizon Internet Services, Inc. 240 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003),
rev’d, 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 924 (2004), and vacated the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling in favor of peer-to-peer developers in Grokster, 545 U.S. 913. See
generally Cynthia L. Webb, Supremes Quietly Change Piracy Debate, WASH. POST, Oct. 13,
2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A29254-2004Oct13.html (describing the Supreme Court’s refusal to entertain the recording industry’s arguments in
the Verizon case). The Court’s abstention is attributed to pending legislation, such as the
Inducing Infringements of Copyrights Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004), and the
percolation of various other cases at the lower court level. See Ken Fisher, RIAA Given the
Snub by Supreme Court, ARS TECHNICA, Oct. 12, 2004, http://arstechnica.com/old/
content/2004/10/4299.ars (noting that the Supreme Court will have several upcoming
opportunities to reconsider copyright issues).
11
Both camps are drifting apart and increasingly reject the other’s governance
model entirely, thus invigorating the discourse. Protests by activist organizations such
as the Electronic Frontier Foundation, digitalconsumer.org, and publicknowledge.org
are intensifying and increasingly speaking in terms of anarchy, “copyfights,” and manifestos. See, e.g., Posting of Siva Vaidhyanathan to SIVACRACY.NET, 90% Crud: The
(Poor) State of Copyright Activism, http://sivacracy.net/blogarchive/2004_06_02_
blogarchive.html ( June 2, 2004) (“How can we have a revolution if we don’t have a
manifesto?”). Others, such as the copyleft movement, dismiss the copyright model altogether. See generally Ira V. Heffan, Note, Copyleft: Licensing Collaborative Works in the
Digital Age, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1487 (1997).
12
Of course, large areas of law are also reactive to technological changes. For instance, new technologies often present new issues for tort law. Although several observations in this Article apply equally to other instances where law and technology interact, this Article focuses squarely on the copyright implications of technology that
creates new means of copying and distributing copyrighted content.
13
See, for example, the legal battle brought by the RIAA against Diamond Multimedia as a result of its production of the “Rio” MP3 player. The RIAA accused Diamond of a multitude of intellectual property violations, including the production of a
digital audio recording device that did not meet the requirements set forth by the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237, 4244,
the failure to employ Serial Copyright Management System (SCMS) technology, and
the failure to pay royalties on revenue earned from the sale of its device. The court
dismissed the claim, holding that general computer technology is not governed by the
AHRA. See Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d
1072, 1075, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 1999).
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Despite copyright law’s historic tendency to respond to new technological developments by adjusting the scope of copyright law (continuing from the printing press to digital applications), our theoretical understanding of the effects of technological changes on copyright law
remains relatively undeveloped. Notwithstanding the general awareness of the intricate relationship between technology and copyright
law, scholarship provides little insight into the causal dynamics between the two. As a result, with each new technological breakthrough,
we are confronted with difficult questions about the relationship between the new technology and copyright law. For example, does the
Internet present a challenge to copyright enforcement that is mostly
related to the scale of infringements, or does it present a qualitative
change that necessitates shifting the paradigm of copyright law? Is it
simply that innovation leads the way and copyright follows? If so, can
we understand the future of copyright law by looking ahead and anticipating changes in technology? Has technology created a paradigm
shift in copyright law, and do current events simply exemplify the notion that laws are slow at adapting to evolving social norms?
This Article seeks to enhance our understanding of the intricate
relationship between copyright law and technology in general and to
examine the formative effects of technology on copyright rules in particular. I argue that technology, by creating an environment of rapid
and unpredictable change, establishes two major conditions that have
a profound effect on copyright law: legal delay and legal uncertainty.
Legal delay is caused by the dynamic and unpredictable nature of
technological innovation. Delay is further amplified in a fast-changing
technological environment because (1) uncertainty postpones the timing of lawmaking and (2) copyright law requires open-ended standards
rather than specific rules. As a result, the legal adaptation of copyright
law necessarily lags behind technological change. Legal uncertainty
results because the general social and economic ramifications are typically unknown when a new technology is introduced. As these ramifications become clear, the process of legal classification faces many ambiguities and difficult issues of interpretation. In copyright law,
breakthrough technologies make it more difficult to apply existing
rules by analogy. Even when courts seek to apply the relatively brightline rules of copyright doctrine, the exact entitlement of rights may be
surprisingly uncertain when applied to a novel technology.
Uncertainty and delay impose significant societal costs. Any variance in the assessments of how existing rules apply to a new technology
may divert behavior away from the social optimum. If a legal standard

2009

Technology and Uncertainty

1837

is uncertain, some individuals may overestimate the legal constraints
and forego beneficial actions, while others may underestimate the very
same constraints and carry out costly actions. Excessive compliance
induces cultural impoverishment, especially when it causes artists to
avoid incorporating copyrighted material even though the use might
be considered noninfringing. In other instances, uncertainty may induce underdeterrence, leading to litigation costs and further polarization between copyright holders and users of technology.
More fundamentally, in Part II, I explain how uncertainty and delay catalyze the actions of copyright owners and users, thus providing
insight into the formation of copyright law. Specifically, I argue that
uncertainty and delay (1) have an enabling effect on anticopyright
sentiments, (2) lead to a greater reliance on self-help efforts by content providers and users, and (3) induce legislative involvement in the
area of copyright law. First, because technological innovation and
new uses precede legal adaptation, technological innovation affects
social norms. By the time that legal issues of copyright scope are
solved with regard to a new technology, users of that technology are
no longer neutral bystanders. Individuals internalize the use of a new
technology and therefore experience loss when a previously “free” use
is banned. As a result, copyright enforcement is frustrated by the
14
stickiness of social norms and the counterproductive effects that result from resisting already internalized norms. Second, the uncertainty and delay increase the reliance on self-help by both users and
copyright owners alike. When copyright owners feel that the law
adapts too slowly and fails to offer adequate protection, they invest in
15
antipiracy-protection technologies. This investment, in turn, motivates users to invest in circumvention technologies, creating an arms
race between content owners and pirates in which the very technology
that is used to create a lock can be used to pick it. This process leads
to recurring lapses in enforcement and increases the polarization between the camps. Third, the hesitation of courts to quickly adapt
copyright law to new technology often translates into judicial defer-

14

See generally Geoffrey Neri, Note, Sticky Fingers or Sticky Norms? Unauthorized Music
Downloading and Unsettled Social Norms, 93 GEO. L.J. 733 (2005) (arguing that the recording industry’s attempts to curb illegal file sharing through educational campaigns,
lawsuits, and legislation are ineffective because of the “stickiness” of prodownloading
social norms).
15
For a critical examination of the effects of self-help measures, see John A. Rothchild, The Social Costs of Technological Protection Measures, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1181,
1198-1203 (2007).
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ence to Congress. Legislative rulemaking in copyright law may have
particular significance for the shaping of copyright law over time, as it
opens the door for greater influence by interest groups. The potential difficulty of reaching political compromise may further extend periods of legal uncertainty in copyright law. By prolonging legal uncertainty, judicial deference gives additional breathing room to the
internalization of anticopyright norms by users and the reliance on
self-help efforts by copyright owners.
Part III concludes by examining normative proposals for copyright
reform. As I argue, the growing complexity and rate of technological
innovation might call for a greater degree of regulatory governance in
copyright law. Like the potential conflict between pollution controls
and economic growth in environmental policy, efforts to secure copyright protection may interfere with progress in the technology sector.
Regulatory approaches may be better suited to balance the interests in
promoting new technology by responding to the changing technological landscape and by balancing competing core principles, all
while providing promise in terms of reducing uncertainty and delay.
Together, legal uncertainty and delay present interrelated complications that inhibit the enforcement of copyright law: anticopying
technology never accomplishes perfect protection, social norms complicate enforcement efforts, and legal adaptation is slow. An analysis
of these intrinsic constraints provides an improved understanding of
the enforcement problems faced by copyright law.
I. DELAY AND UNCERTAINTY IN COPYRIGHT LAW
Copyright law has a symbiotic relationship with technology. Generally, new technology enables novel ways to enjoy copyrighted con16
tent, which opens new markets for artists to sell their licensed works.
When technology creates new means of copying or communicating
copyrighted works, difficult questions arise about the relationship between existing copyright law and the use of the copyrighted content
17
One of the most
made available through the new technology.
16

The origin of copyright law lies in technology. Investments in the printing press
prompted the development of the legislation that granted the first copyrights to publishers of written works. See, e.g., Hal R. Varian, Copying and Copyright, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Spring 2005, at 121, 122 (noting the impact of the printing press on the development
of England’s Copyright Act of 1709).
17
Some describe the development of copyright law as the emergence of “awkward
ambiguities and widening areas of legal dispute . . . created by the application to new
technological developments of laws pertaining to . . . copyrights.” Paul A. David, Intel-
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prominent legal issues in copyright law pertains to fair use: does the
new use fall within the legal category of free use, or is it within the ex18
clusive right of copyright owners and therefore in need of a license?
As such, most pages in the history of copyright law involve drawing
boundaries around new uses of content created by technology. And
so, time after time, technological advancements have affected copyright law by demanding answers to difficult questions regarding the
scope of the law. For example, is a person who stores copyrighted
music files on her computer in publicly accessible folders liable for infringing upon the copyright owner’s exclusive right to distribute? Is a
software developer vicariously liable for copyright infringement when
it distributes technology that enables individuals to share both copy19
righted and noncopyrighted material? Can companies be held liable
for selling technology that enables users to skip commercials with the
20
click of a button? In each of these cases, courts are asked to ascertain the “limits of statutory language” through judicial interpretation
21
and interpolation. Although this basic understanding of the relationship between technology and copyright law is correct, it only goes
so far in that it ignores important effects that result from the relationship between copyright law and technological change.

lectual Property Institutions and the Panda’s Thumb: Patents, Copyrights, and Trade Secrets in
Economic Theory and History, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 19, 19 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 1993).
18
See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1614 (1982)
(“Fair use is one label courts use when they approve a user’s departure from the market.”); see also Christopher Alan Hower, Reviving Fair Use: Why Sony’s Expansion of Fair
Use Sparked the File-Sharing Craze, 7 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 75, 76-86 (2008) (discussing the application of fair use to file sharing); R. Terry Parker, Sold Downstream: Free
Speech, Fair Use, and Anti-Circumvention Law, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 299, 300-02 (2007) (describing fair use as a “safety valve” for free speech).
19
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-37
(2005) (requiring “clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement” for secondary liability, not “mere knowledge of infringing potential”); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Napster’s failure to
police the system’s ‘premises,’ combined with a showing that Napster financially benefits from the continuing availability of infringing files on its system, leads to the imposition of vicarious liability.”).
20
See Ned Snow, The TiVo Question: Does Skipping Commercials Violate Copyright Law?,
56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 27, 81 (2005) (concluding that using a digital video recorder to
skip commercials violates copyright law and arguing that device manufacturers should
be contributorily liable); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 454-55 (1984) (permitting “time-shifting” as fair use).
21
Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 857, 858 (1987).
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As this Article explains, rapid technological change creates two
major conditions that determine the direction and evolution of copyright law: legal delay and legal uncertainty. As I describe below, the
uncertainty as to how to apply existing copyright law to emerging uses
catalyzes the actions of copyright owners and users. The remainder of
this Part further discusses legal delay and legal uncertainty in copyright law. Part II describes the effect that these conditions have on
the behavior of the major stakeholders in copyright law.
A. Legal Delay in Copyright Law
Technological change is characterized by a high rate of innova22
tion and an inherently unpredictable outcome. The unpredictable
path of innovation is demonstrated best by the many examples in
which the social and economic impacts of a revolutionary technology
were unforeseen, even by their own creators. Famous anecdotes include the decision of the CEO of Kodak to dismiss a copying process
brought to him by a research employee who then left and became the
23
founder of Xerox, and the historical mistake of IBM to dismiss the
24
notion of a market for home computers.
Because innovation is rapid and unpredictable, the adaptation of
copyright law lags far behind the introduction of new technological advancements. Four central factors contribute to the lag that occurs when
copyright law responds to a new technology. First, the creation of new
legal rules takes time. Lawmaking is a complex process that involves
various procedural safeguards and many different institutions and actors. While innovation can also be the result of a long, elaborate, and
planned process, many innovative breakthroughs are spontaneous and
quick, such as the invention of the Post-it Note, which was accidentally
created by a researcher attempting to develop a durable bonding

22

In the computing field, the rapid pace of innovation is said to be governed by
Moore’s Law, which states that the number of transistors that may be placed on an integrated circuit grows exponentially and doubles approximately every two years. It has
become a general signpost of the speed of technological progress. See Gordon E.
Moore, Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits, ELECTRONICS, Apr. 19, 1965,
at 114, available at http://download.intel.com/research/silicon/moorespaper.pdf.
23
Karen Garst, Our Paradigm Shift, OR. ST. B. BULL., Oct. 1998, at 47, 51.
24
See Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case
of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 86 n.41 (1994) (noting that IBM initially regarded computers as having only scientific applications).
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25

agent. Especially in the age of digital technology, where the distribution of innovative products does not necessarily require elaborate plan26
ning and financial investment, the gap widens between the application
of innovation and the consolidation of its copyright legal status.
Second, the dynamic and unpredictable nature of technological
innovation makes it difficult for lawmakers to predict or anticipate
forthcoming inventions. In other words, it is difficult to reduce delay
by writing copyright laws to anticipate coming trends, especially since
27
past innovations are not always reliable indicators of what is to come.
This fact complicates efforts to reduce legal delay by acting proactively.
Third, the unpredictability of innovation necessitates the deployment of open-ended standards in copyright law. While such rules reduce error costs and enable copyright decision makers to be more
flexible, these open-ended standards increase the amount of decision
28
making at the judicial level, which further contributes to legal delay.
Finally, the initial ambiguity as to the potential social and economic implications of a novel technology is the fourth contributing
factor to legal delay in copyright. Often, the implications of novel
uses of copyrighted content only materialize in the minds of copyright
29
owners once the use has already become widespread and visible. It
must first become apparent that the use of novel technology entails
substantial opportunity costs to producers—that is, that there are
30
The initial ambiguity of the socioeco“gains to be internalized.”
nomic implications of a new technology can be illustrated, for exam25

See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Nonobviousness: A Comment on Three Learned Papers, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 431, 439 (2008).
26
See Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112
YALE L.J. 369, 400-15 (2002) (discussing open-source software and peer production).
27
For example, the introduction of the audio tape presented no indication to
lawmakers of a future in which all content would be playable in digital formats. This is
evidenced by the fact that the AHRA did not account for such a change and thus became virtually obsolete after the court in Diamond stated that a computer hard drive is
not within the meaning of a “digital audio recording device.” See Recording Indus.
Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999). See generally
Nika Aldrich, An Exploration of Rights Management Technologies Used in the Music Industry,
2007 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 051001, at 5, http://bciptf.org/index.php?option=
com_content&task=view&id=30.
28
See infra text accompanying notes 82-87.
29
Historically, copyright owners have always tolerated minor infringements. See
generally R. Anthony Reese, Innocent Infringement in U.S. Copyright Law: A History, 30
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 133 (2007).
30
On the evolution of intellectual property rights, see Ben Depoorter, The Several
Lives of Mickey Mouse: The Expanding Boundaries of Intellectual Property Law, 9 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 34-41 (2004).
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ple, by peer-to-peer music exchanges. The music industry discovered
that huge profits could be made by delivering music in a compressed
format (MP3) only after such exchanges were already relatively com31
mon. More than a year passed between the introduction of Napster,
the widely used file-sharing application, and the onset of litigation by
32
the recording industry. Only when the opportunity costs of unregulated use become apparent will copyright owners seek the expansion
33
of copyright law through litigation and legislation. While copyright
owners seek to extend the reach of intellectual property laws so that
they include emerging technological applications, both copyright
owners and users of new technologies operate in a vacuum of considerable legal uncertainty.
To illustrate legal uncertainty, Table 1 provides an overview of ten
major innovative breakthroughs that gave rise to copyright issues.
The two columns on the left indicate the type of technology and the
year that it was introduced. The three columns on the right indicate
the final resolution of the main copyright questions (either by way of
judicial decision or new legislation), the year of the decision, and the
number of years between the introduction of the technology and the
final outcome of the legal issue. As can be concluded from the table,
the average time that it takes to ascertain an innovation’s copyright
34
status is approximately seven years and two months.
31

See Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 63, 99 (2002) (“Even with the introduction and rapid popularity of digitallyencoded compact disks (CDs) and the proliferation of microcomputers beginning in
the early 1980s, the record industry did not appreciate the dramatic changes that
would be brought about by the emerging digital technologies.”).
32
Napster counted 26.4 million users as of February 2001. See Press Release, Jupiter Media Metrix, Global Napster Usage Plummets but New File-Sharing Alternatives
Gaining Ground, Reports Jupiter Media Metrix ( July 20, 2001), available at
http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?id=249.
33
Jane Ginsburg colorfully describes this first formal step in the expansion of copyright law as copyright holders’ “Pavlovian” response to new technology. Jane C. Ginsburg, Essay, How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 61, 66 (2002).
34
Legal delay was calculated for copyright issues involving the following innovations: the cassette tape, the VCR, the CD, the digital audio tape (DAT), the DVD, Bulletin Board System (BBS) boards, the MP3 format, the Rio, centralized file-sharing
software (Napster), and decentralized file-sharing software (Grokster). Some innovations created multiple copyright issues, leading to multiple decisions made by courts at
different times. Most cases, however, involved a similar question: whether the new
technology’s novel means of sharing or distributing copyrighted content fell within the
bundle of rights held by copyright owners. Note that the calculations in Table 1 serve
merely to illustrate legal delay and to give a sense of the average length of the copyright adaptation period. Individual differences between cases may largely depend on
factors unrelated to technology. For instance, individual differences in time between
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Table 1: Average Legal Delay
Technology

Year
Introduced

Audio
Cassette
VCR

1963

CD

1982

DAT

1986

DVD
BBS Boards
MP3 Format

1996
1979
1993

Diamond Rio

1998

Napster

1999

Grokster

2001

1972

Legal Resolution
Sound Recording Amendment
35
of 1971
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
36
City Studios, Inc.
Audio Home Recording Act of
37
1992
Audio Home Recording Act of
38
1992
39
DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner
40
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com,
41
Inc.
Recording Industry Ass’n of America
42
v. Diamond Multimedia Systems
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
43
Inc.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc.
44
v. Grokster, Ltd.

Year
Resolved

Years
Elapsed

1971

8

1984

12

1992

10

1992

6

2004
1993
2000

8
14
7

1999

1

2001

2

2005

4

innovation and legal adaptation may likely be influenced by changes in procedural
laws that have taken place between the various cases.
35
Pub. L. No. 92-140, sec. 2, § 101(e), 85 Stat. 391, 392 (“[D]iscs or tapes for use
in mechanical music-producing machines adapted to reproduce copyright musical
works, shall be considered copies of the copyrighted musical works . . . .”).
36
464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984) (holding that Sony’s sale of Betamax equipment did
not constitute contributory negligence).
37
Pub. L. No. 102-563, sec. 2, § 1008, 106 Stat. 4237, 4244 (“No action may be
brought under this title alleging infringement of copyright based on the manufacture,
importation, or distribution of a digital audio recording device . . . or based on the
noncommercial use by a consumer of such a device . . . .”).
38
Id.
39
10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 196 (Ct. App. 2004) (concluding on remand that the issuance of an injunction prohibiting the distribution of DVD-decoding software was an
abuse of discretion).
40
839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556-59 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (holding that the bulletin board
infringed Playboy’s exclusive rights of display and public distribution, and that fair use
did not apply).
41
92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that defendant’s online posting of
MP3 files for access by individuals who could prove that they owned a CD copy was not
protected fair use).
42
180 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 1999) (denying, on appeal, the RIAA’s motion for
a preliminary injunction, because the Rio is unable to make copies from transmissions).
43
239 F.3d 1004, 121-24 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that Napster had sufficient
knowledge of the availability of infringing material to impose contributory and vicarious liability).
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It is important to note, however, that legal delay can sometimes be
justified. Properly conceived, lawmaking is similar to an investment
45
decision in that timing is of the essence. In this sense, at any given
time there are both costs and benefits to changing the law. Acting too
rapidly creates the risk that the new rule will be premature. Doing so
will likely increase error costs, as the rules will be ill-suited to govern
the future of the developing relationship between technological innovations and copyrighted materials. By contrast, waiting may lead to
increased future benefits by enabling legislation that is better adjusted
46
to the new technology. On the other hand, waiting increases legal
uncertainty and postpones the realization of any short-term gains that
result when a legal rule is tailored to the most recent developments.
Therefore, to strike a balance, lawmakers should consider the opportunity costs of immediate investments in new legal rules in addition to
the potential benefits of waiting.
There are a number of reasons that some delay in copyright law
might be favorable. As mentioned earlier, the field of copyright law is
47
heavily influenced by underlying technology. Because technological
48
cycles of innovative products are highly unpredictable, there is a real

44

545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005) (holding that distributing software with manifest
intent to promote copyright infringement can render the software’s distributor liable
for the infringing actions of third parties).
45
Francesco Parisi & Nita Ghei, Legislate Today or Wait Until Tomorrow? An Investment Approach to Law Making, 23 J. PUB. FIN. & PUB. CHOICE 19 (2006). As with regular
investments in assets, lawmaking decisions involve a degree of (1) irreversibility, (2)
uncertainty over future returns, and (3) discretion with regard to the timing of those
investments.
46
Id.
47
See supra text accompanying notes 16-21.
48
Although there is considerable debate regarding the causes of innovation, it
may suffice to note that the technological cycle of an innovative product is highly unpredictable. For instance, technological innovation is only partially susceptible to external influence. Although it is widely recognized that market forces help shape the
course of innovation, scholars recognize that innovation also runs an independent
course. On the former position, see generally Jacob Schmookler, Economic Sources of
Inventive Activity, J. ECON. HIST., Mar. 1962, at 1. Evidence in support of the theory of
technological opportunity suggests that markets often follow innovations, and not vice
versa. See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
(Redvers Opie trans., 1934); F.M. Scherer, Demand-Pull and Technological Invention:
Schmookler Revisited, 30 J. INDUS. ECON. 225 (1982). This is known as the debate on
technology demand-pull versus technology opportunism. For an overview of empirical
work on whether social and economic conditions drive innovation or whether societal
economic forces trace independent innovation, see Thomas B. Åstebro & Kristina B.
Dahlin, Opportunity Knocks, 34 RES. POL’Y 1404 (2005).
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likelihood that the value of a new copyright regulation will increase
49
over time. First, because copyright law is a field dominated by rapidly changing technology, any newly adopted rule might prove to be
ineffective or rendered obsolete as a technology becomes outdated or
50
is replaced by new innovation. Second, technological changes have
rapid growth rates along paths that are notoriously difficult to predict
ahead of time. This unpredictability increases the benefits of delaying
final judgment until the ramifications of a new technology can be ascertained with some confidence. Third, lawmaking involves costs,
such as those created by learning and rewriting statutes. Fourth, any
potential mistake is likely to be very costly given the economic and
51
cultural impact of copyright industries.
One possible drawback to waiting is that it forgoes any potential
benefits that could be gained from legal experimentation. By awaiting
further developments, the legal system loses the opportunity to intervene and possibly produce socially desired effects. In the field of
technology, however, it is often said that technological maturation is a
process that runs its own course. Legal experimentation in this process might simply delay maturation of the technology and the revela52
tion of its true social and economic impact. Moreover, early legal intervention might affect the course of technological change, a
potentially irreversible consequence.
Contrary to contemporary legal scholarship, which has mostly neglected the value of waiting, courts often recognize the value of defer49

See Francesco Parisi et al., The Value of Waiting in Lawmaking, 18 EUR. J.L. &
ECON. 131, 134 (2004) (U.K.) (arguing that adopting a law is akin to investing in that
the value of the law depends on its discounted future benefits).
50
Consider, for instance, how the Audio Home Recording Act became virtually obsolete with the emergence of personal home computers after the court in Diamond held
that a computer’s hard drive is not a “digital audio recording device” under the Act because audio recording is not the personal computer’s “primary purpose.” Recording
Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1999).
51
In 2001, copyright industries (including those involved in movies, television
programs, home videos, business and entertainment software, books, and music and
sound recordings) contributed an estimated $535.1 billion to the U.S. economy, accounting for approximately 5.24% of GDP. STEPHEN E. SIWEK, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES
IN THE U.S. ECONOMY:
THE 2002 REPORT 3 (2002), available at http://
www.iipa.com/pdf/2002_SIWEK_FULL.pdf. On the role of copyright in the American
economy, see the sources cited in Ginsburg, supra note 33, at 61 n.1. A similar trend
emerges on a global scale. See generally OECD, THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY: A
SET OF FACTS AND FIGURES (1999).
52
See, e.g., Aldrich, supra note 27, at 5 (“[W]hile the DAT machine was released in
1986, . . . the threat of litigation prevented the machines from entering the market for
nearly seven years.”).
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ring final judgment until technology matures or until the direction of
53
technological change becomes apparent. For instance, in Grokster,
Judge Thomas cautioned against steadfast legal adaptation in times of
rapid technological change:
[A]s we have observed, we live in a quicksilver technological environment with courts ill-suited to fix the flow of internet innovation. The introduction of new technology is always disruptive to old markets, and
particularly to those copyright owners whose works are sold through
well-established distribution mechanisms. Yet, history has shown that
time and market forces often provide equilibrium in balancing interests,
whether the new technology be a player piano, a copier, a tape recorder,
a video recorder, a personal computer, a karaoke machine, or an MP3
player. Thus, it is prudent for courts to exercise caution before restructuring liability theories for the purpose of addressing specific market
54
abuses, despite their apparent present magnitude.

As will be discussed further, courts’ hesitance to quickly adapt
copyright law to new technology shifts the timing decision to the legislative branch, which may result in additional delay. The ripple effects
of legal delay are explored in further detail in Part II. First, however, I
examine the second condition of copyright formation with regard to
technology: legal uncertainty.
B. Legal Uncertainty
When a new technology that enables novel uses of copyrighted
content is introduced, its social and economic ramifications are still
generally unknown. These ramifications, however, become clear soon
afterwards, and the process of legally classifying the novel uses must
begin. When attempting to apply existing copyright laws to new technological developments, many ambiguities and difficult issues of interpretation emerge. Thus, the introduction of a new technology is
always followed by a period of legal uncertainty in copyright law.
What I mean by legal uncertainty is the difficulty of perfectly predicting ex ante how the courts will apply the law to new circumstances

53

See, e.g., Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489 (2d Cir.
2000). Judge Calabresi, writing for a unanimous panel, delayed his decision, awaiting
the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), which would eventually become effective while the case was pending before the Court of Appeals. Id. at 496-97.
The ACPA resolved most issues surrounding the allocation of domain names involving
cybersquatting. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (2006).
54
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1167 (9th
Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
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55

ex post. In a broader sense, legal uncertainty may also refer to the
difficulty of perfectly predicting ex ante how courts or legislators will
56
categorize actions in new statutes. By contrast, legal certainty refers
to a condition in which a legal system is presumed to be without any
gaps. In such instances, abstract laws can be seamlessly applied to
concrete cases by way of logic, and all conduct can thus be accurately
57
categorized as either complying with or violating the law.
58
Of course, legal uncertainty pervades all areas of the law. Some
argue that the law is so inherently indeterminate that authoritative legal texts and judicial precedents generally permit multiple answers to
59
lawsuits. Still, while many areas of law adjust to gradually evolving
social and macroeconomic changes, copyright law constantly needs to
respond to issues raised by technological advances that are often more
erratic and more difficult to predict. Also, many of the legal ambiguities created by novel technologies go to the very heart of the balance
of rights in copyright law, such as issues of copyright subject matter,
the scope of rights, and the boundaries of the public domain. For instance, new technology regularly poses fundamental questions of
60
definition, such as “is this a copy?”

55

Note that there is a distinction between risk and uncertainty. Individuals are subject to risk if (1) an event may or may not happen in the future, and (2) the chance that
the event will happen is known. By contrast, an event is uncertain if (1) it may or may
not happen in the future, and (2) we do not know the chances that it will happen. See
generally FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921).
56
A more precise, but also more limiting, definition of uncertainty pertains to
situations where a given act is “said by informed attorneys to have an expected official
outcome at or near the 0.5 level of predictability.” Anthony D’Amato, Legal Uncertainty,
71 CAL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1983).
57
MAX WEBER, ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward
Shils trans., 1954).
58
See generally D’Amato, supra note 56 (describing a trend toward greater uncertainty); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974) (examining the optimal level of precision for rules and standards); Werner Z. Hirsch, Reducing Law’s Uncertainty and Complexity, 21 UCLA L. REV.
1233 (1974) (discussing considerations involved in, and obstacles to, reducing uncertainty); Jason Scott Johnston, Uncertainty, Chaos, and the Torts Process: An Economic
Analysis of Legal Form, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 341 (1991) (examining how rules and balancing approaches evolve out of litigation).
59
For a critique of this strand of thought, which is most prevalent in the area of
critical legal studies, see Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1989).
60
Consider how the questions of copyright and fair use with regard to peer-topeer networks resemble a hypothetical scenario in which a new technology (for instance, low-air travel with jet packs) would allow new ways of trespassing over real
property boundaries. To understand the major effect of technology on copyright law,
imagine further that millions of people would be engaging in such acts of trespass
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Moreover, technological breakthroughs, by their nature, make it
more difficult to apply existing rules by analogy. The legal struggle
over the sharing of music on peer-to-peer networks illustrates the unexpected ambiguities that are regularly presented by new technology.
The introduction of file-sharing software, high-level bandwidth access
to the Internet, and advanced compression technology vastly expanded individuals’ opportunities to exchange music.
As a result of these combined advancements, the sharing of copyrighted content began to occur on an unprecedented scale, creating
many difficult questions about the potential liability for copyright infringement on behalf of intermediaries (the creators of peer-to-peer
software and Internet service providers) and end users. Specifically,
file sharing challenged the boundaries of noncommercial music borrowing. On the one hand, peer-to-peer file-sharing activities are very
different from the conventional notion of piracy: infringements lack
a commercial purpose, there are no conventional intermediaries, and
the technology has applications that are clearly noninfringing. On
the other hand, because of the scale of online music sharing and its
61
alleged negative effect on entertainment-industry profits, it became
obvious that file sharing could not be treated as analogous to sharing
music among friends—a practice traditionally tolerated by copyright
holders. Despite many years of intense litigation over the legal consequences of peer-to-peer technology, many copyright questions remain
62
unresolved.
An important consideration, the consequences of which I will ad63
dress in more detail, is that new technologies often present so much
while courts were debating whether the new technology amounted to trespass and
whether property owners were allowed to prevent such encroachments. Although such
definitional cases are certainly not unheard of in areas such as property law, they are
few and far between. For example, mass air travel created the legal issue of whether
individual landowners can prevent airlines from flying over their property. See United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1946) (concluding that federal statutes create a
public highway above certain altitudes).
61
See Stan J. Liebowitz, File Sharing: Creative Destruction or Just Plain Destruction?, 49
J.L. & ECON. 1 (2006) (identifying file sharing as the cause of declining record sales);
see also RIAA, For Students Doing Reports, http://www.riaa.com/faq.php (last visited
Apr. 15, 2009) (“One credible analysis by the Institute for Policy Innovation concludes
that global music piracy causes $12.5 billion of economic losses every year, 71,060 U.S.
jobs lost, a loss of $2.7 billion in workers’ earnings, and a loss of $422 million in tax
revenues, $291 million in personal income tax and $131 million in lost corporate income and production taxes.”).
62
For a review of various current issues, see generally Electronic Frontier Foundation, http://www.eff.org (last visited Apr. 15, 2009).
63
See infra Section II.A.
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legal ambiguity that (self-serving) users of the technology deem the
novel uses to be noninfringing under their own understandings of
copyright law.
To further illustrate the considerable uncertainty in copyright law,
consider the sequence, timing, and outcome of the litigation in MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. It took almost five years to
establish that developers of decentralized peer-to-peer technology
could be held vicariously liable for copyright infringements on their
64
networks. Moreover, prior to the Supreme Court’s development of
the “inducement” theory in Grokster, both the trial court and the Ninth
Circuit had firmly decided that developers of decentralized peer-topeer technology could not be held accountable under existing copy65
right law. Thus, in a period of five years, the legal status of decentralized file sharing shifted entirely.
Generally, during periods of uncertainty, copyright holders and
users of new technology assume either that (1) the new technology is
encompassed by the current intellectual property laws (by relying on
analogy or precedent) or (2) the new technology is sufficiently different from existing technology that analogy is not warranted (the differentiation position). As we will see below, an individual’s normative
beliefs and viewpoints about the purpose of copyright law are likely to
influence the position that she takes while awaiting judicially or legislatively established certainty.
II. THE BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS OF DELAY AND UNCERTAINTY
As outlined above, the inherent uncertainty surrounding a technological innovation may delay the adjustment of existing laws. Such
delays engender considerable uncertainty as to the legal status of the
developing uses of copyrighted content created by the new technology. In this Part, I outline the various actions that are set in motion by
legal uncertainty and delay.

64

The complaint was filed on October 2, 2001. See Complaint for Damages and
Injunctive Relief for Copyright Infringement, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (No. 01-8541). The Supreme
Court reached its decision on June 27, 2005. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v.
Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005). Final disposition on remand did not occur until
September 27, 2006. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 454 F. Supp.
2d 966 (C.D. Cal. 2006). This chronology does not include the litigation that is now
taking place to establish the boundaries and precise meaning of the “inducement”
theory established by the Supreme Court.
65
259 F. Supp. 2d at 1031-32, aff ’d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004).
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A. The Emergence of Anticopyright Norms
Most revolutionary technological advances are followed by periods
of uncertainty about how existing copyright law applies to the new
technology. As described in Section I.A., the resolution of emerging
issues in copyright law takes time, and difficult questions need to be
answered before any official changes can or should take place. Those
making the legal adjustments must consider the timing of lawmaking.
On top of that, it takes time to move matters through the adjudicative
or legislative process.
During this time, the application of copyright principles to new
technology is highly uncertain. As a factual matter, however, new
technological uses of content often proceed in settings where there is
little to no enforcement of copyright law. Take, for instance, the
sphere of open-access file sharing that users of Napster enjoyed in the
initial years. Legal action against the developers of Napster and its users lagged because it was not immediately obvious to copyright holders that peer-to-peer file sharing would become widespread. Even
when the impact of file sharing began to become clear, enforcement
remained virtually nonexistent because any legal action undertaken by
the music industry awaited judicial validation—that is, a judicial determination regarding copyright law’s relation to the new technology.
How do such conditions of ambiguity affect the behavior of the
new technology’s users? Sometimes uncertainty will induce risk-averse
behavior. Directors of independent movies or budget documentaries,
for instance, are likely to apply for licenses for small segments or to
remove content if it is uncertain whether the fair use doctrine ap66
plies. If there is any chance of incurring liability on the basis of
copyright infringement, there might simply be too much to lose (and
too little to gain) from using a small amount of copyrighted content.
But uncertainty might also lead individuals to proceed on the assumption that a novel technological use does not constitute copyright
infringement. Legal uncertainty may induce this default reaction in
the following manner. First, as commentators have noted, “legal un67
certainty can lead to inefficient risk seeking behavior.”
Second,

66

See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116
YALE L.J. 882, 884, 896-99 (2007) (arguing that a “[b]etter safe than sued” mentality leads
to customary licensing practices, which ultimately find their way into legal doctrine).
67
Howard Latin, “Good” Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA
L. REV. 1193, 1240 (1994); see also John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 965 (1984) (analyzing
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when facing a certain (low) probability of enforcement, as when
downloading music on a peer-to-peer network, legal uncertainty further discounts this initial probability because there is some chance
that the alleged illegal activity will in fact not be deemed copyright infringement by courts at a later stage. This additional reduction of the
probability of effective enforcement might tip the balance well in favor of downloading—even for individuals who are not disposed to
take risks. Third, new technologies may create enough legal ambiguity that, in the minds of (self-serving) users of the technology, such
novel uses are considered noninfringing. Even if the issues are relatively clean-cut for legal experts, there may be enough latitude for laypersons to develop self-serving interpretations of copyright rules as
applied to the new technology.
Psychological theories provide insight into the behavioral effects
68
of uncertainty on individuals. These findings highlight individuals’
inclinations to construe facts in ways that align with their own precon69
ceptions. And, as cognitive psychology demonstrates, many personal
beliefs originate in self-interested behavior. For instance, the benefits
derived from freely downloading music online can easily lead to a
normative belief that file sharing should be legal. File sharers might
therefore engage in self-interested norm adjustments as a type of selfserving bias (e.g., “I want to download music, so I think prohibiting
70
peer-to-peer activities is unjust”). Similarly, a recent study on tax
avoidance found that individuals “adjust their own beliefs so as to justify their behavior as right and ethical. They then generalize these
“ways in which uncertainty about the application of legal standards can give parties
economic incentives to ‘overcomply’ or to ‘undercomply’—that is, to modify their behavior to a greater or lesser extent than a legal rule requires”). For more details, see
infra Section III.A.
68
See, e.g., Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse:
The Role Of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 111-13 (1997). The authors
assigned participants in a study to be either the plaintiff or the defendant in a tort case
regarding a car accident with a maximum potential damages payment of $100,000.
The plaintiffs’ prediction of the likely judicial award was on average $14,500 higher
than the defendants’. The plaintiffs’ suggestion of a ‘fair’ figure was $17,700 higher
than the defendants’. Id.
69
Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1314-15 (2003) (stating that when
an individual is presented with “competing factual claims,” she is most likely to accept
those proposed by individuals “who share [her] cultural outlooks”).
70
See Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Porgarsky, An Experimental Investigation of Deterrence:
Cheating, Self-Serving Bias, and Impulsivity, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 167, 171 (2003) (“[S]elfserving bias [is] the tendency for individuals to shade judgments in a manner favorable
to themselves.”).
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views to others, presumably to gain further social support.” Current
research on the causality of norms and behavior sheds insight into
possible underlying psychological processes. According to the theory
of cognitive dissonance, when humans
sense something in the world that is inconsistent with the cognitive
frame through which we see the world, we initially (unconsciously) ignore or distort our perception. If that becomes impossible, we eventually amend our cognitive frame (i.e., the way we see and understand the
72
world) to incorporate our new perception.

When file sharers notice that file sharing is pursued in courts, it
might not correspond with their view of the world, and therefore they
might ignore copyright litigation for some time. Despite the obvious
self-interested origin of such anticopyright norms, “people assert that
interests have nothing to do with their behavior in following various
73
norms.” As I will discuss in more detail, such ex post rationalizations of self-interested anticopyright conduct have important policy
implications.
An interesting indirect effect of uncertainty and delay thus relates
to the enabling effect that it has on copyright social norms. By the
time that legal questions of copyright scope are solved with regard to
new technologies, users of the new technology are no longer neutral
bystanders. The time between a perceived free use of technology and
the determination of its legal status allows for individuals to get accustomed to the use of a new technology. This effect likely affects the
preferences and behavior of users in at least two ways. First, after a
certain period of time, the evaluation of one’s behavior is internal74
ized. As a result of this process of norm internalization, the norm
becomes more robust and presents a more ardent challenge to legal
75
enforcement efforts.

71

Michael Wenzel, Motivation or Rationalisation? Causal Relations Between Ethics,
Norms, and Tax Compliance, 26 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 491 (2005). In this pioneering study
on tax evasion, Wenzel observes “bi-directional causality between ethics/norms and
compliance.” Id. at 504. He concludes that, for taxpayers, tax-evasion conduct feeds
back into personal and social norms. Id.
72
Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy, and How
We Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV. 155, 201 n.113 (1996).
73
Russell Hardin, Law and Social Norms in the Large, 86 VA. L. REV. 1821, 1831 (2000).
74
On the internalization of social norms, see generally Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws
Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577 (2000).
75
See Neri, supra note 14, at 748 (“[P]eople’s behavior generally conforms more
closely with internalized social norms regarding how people should behave than with
laws dictating behavior . . . .”).
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Second, users of new technology might experience loss when the
previously “free” access to content made available by the new technol76
ogy is suddenly subject to licensing fees or obstructed altogether.
The endowment effect might further affect the sentiments of users of
77
that technology. Research shows that individuals value something
that they lose after possessing more than they would value the exact
same thing if they had never possessed it at all. The self-serving perception of free use, as enabled by uncertainty and delay, may thus
amplify norm effects in copyright law.
Indeed, several studies have documented the emergence of an an78
ticopyright culture. It is well settled that file sharing, for instance, has
79
an overwhelmingly strong normative component.
Many users of
peer-to-peer applications operate under a metanorm that file-sharing
technology is wealth maximizing and that copyright law is outdated or
80
biased towards music publishers. Data show that norms among young
people between the ages of thirteen and seventeen are strikingly anti-

76

This brings to mind the famous statement of Attorney General Robert Kennedy
that “the poor man looks upon the law as an enemy, not as a friend. For him the law is
always taking something away.” Robert Kennedy, Att’y Gen. of the U.S., Address at the
University of Chicago, May 1, 1964, quoted in Hirsch, supra note 58, at 1247.
77
This effect is compounded by inherent product uncertainty in content
industries. As one commentator noted, “one of the reasons that business people in
Hollywood are so nervous is that they never really know what’s going to win or what’s
going to lose.” Posting of Paul Schmelzer to Eyeteeth: A Journal of Incisive Ideas, The
Anarchist in the Library: Discussing Cultural Democracy with Siva Vaidhyanathan,
http://eyeteeth.blogspot.com/2003/04/anarchist-in-library-discussing.html (Apr. 21,
2003).
78
These studies have also documented the strong norm component of downloading and file sharing. See, e.g., Daniel J. Gervais, The Price of Social Norms: Towards a
Liability Regime for File-Sharing 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 39, 51 (2004) (noting that legal
changes in copyright clashed with the social norms at play in online music sharing);
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on
the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505, 549 (2003) (discussing how computer
code may solve collective action problems). The definition of “social norm” is
somewhat elusive. For the purpose at hand we side with the notion that a social norm
is a social regularity, a behavior that is widely adopted in society. Social norms,
however, are not merely what people do; they also correspond with a conception
within society, or a subgroup thereof, of what people should do. See Richard H.
McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 350-51
(1997) (offering a definition of “norm”).
79
See Yuval Feldman & Janice Nadler, The Law and Norms of File Sharing, 43 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 577, 605-12 (2006) (examining how the creation of new laws influences
both social norms and the social perception of illegal downloading).
80
See Ku, supra note 9, at 268 (“The economics of digital technology also suggests
that the exclusive rights created by copyright are inconsistent with society’s interest in
promoting the creation of new music and making music widely available to the public.”).
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copyright. Prior to the RIAA’s heavily publicized lawsuits against consumers for illegal downloading, only twenty percent of teenagers under
the age of seventeen believed that it was “wrong” to download a song
without permission from the author, compared to forty-eight percent
of individuals between thirty-five and fifty-four and sixty-three percent
81
of individuals over fifty-five years old. These internalized norms have
created significant obstacles to copyright enforcement. In recognizing
the robustness of these anticopyright norms and the difficulties experienced in trying to change such norms, scholars have increasingly
suggested that social norms have tipped so far in favor of file sharing
that old business models are now outdated and must be replaced with
82
models built specifically around file-sharing norms.
B. Copyright Self-Help
A second effect of uncertainty and delay relates to the emergence
of a technological arms race between content holders and developers
of information technology. When copyright holders feel that legal adaptation to technological developments is too slow or inadequate to
offer them protection, they are likely to take matters into their own
hands. The uncertainty and delay of enforcement is thus likely to increase reliance on self-help by both users and copyright owners alike.
Specifically in the field of digital music and movie content, copyright holders have included structural blocks within their content to
83
physically stop end users’ infringement. For instance, at the beginning of the digital revolution, some publishers felt so strongly that the
law left them vulnerable that they threatened to withhold the release

81

Press Release, E-Poll, E-Poll Study Looks at Consumers [sic] Attitudes Before and
After RIAA Lawsuits (Nov. 4, 2003), available at http://www.prnewswire.com/cgibin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/11-04-2003/0002050963&EDATE. Even
after the lawsuits, slightly less than one-third of teenagers thought that downloading music was “wrong.” Id.
82
See Robert C. Piasentin, Unlawful? Innovative? Unstoppable? A Comparative Analysis of the Potential Legal Liability Facing P2P End-Users in the United States, United Kingdom,
and Canada, 14 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 195, 198 (2006) (arguing that striking a balance between the wants of both end users and copyright owners is the most effective
means of regulating file sharing).
83
See Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100
NW. U. L. REV. 655, 703 (2006) (contending that improving copy protection to make
illegal downloading more difficult will curb behavior, and will thus shape social
norms—a task that the “fiat-only regime” is too weak to accomplish.).
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of their products in digital formats until digital-rights-management
84
tools could be secured against circumvention.
As sophisticated prevention technology became more effective,
however, the development of devices capable of circumventing the
protection measures quickly followed. As of today, no technology has
proven to be terribly effective at preventing copying. In most instances, the very technology that is used to create a digital lock can be
85
used to pick (“hack”) that lock. The circumvention of DVD Content
Scrambling Systems, RealNetworks’s streaming protection measures,
Adobe’s eBook reader, and the security code of the Xbox game console illustrate that for every enhancement in technological protection
of intellectual property, some specialist will be able to circumvent that
86
technology.
This process resembles an arms race between content providers
87
and hackers. At different intervals in the encryption-decryption arms
race, one camp is ahead while the other is playing catch-up. The cyclical nature of the technological struggle for control of digital content thus creates voids in the enforcement of copyright law.
Overall, this process contributes to the problem of enforcement
by increasing the costs of both owners and users and by generating

84

The passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105304, 112 Stat. 2863 (1998), provided some peace of mind for those publishers who
held significant doubt about the future. For a detailed look at the Act’s provisions, see
generally David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 673 (2000).
85
See Competition, Innovation, and Public Policy in the Digital Age: Is the Marketplace
Working to Protect Digital Creative Works? Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. 89-92 (2002) (testimony of Edward W. Felten, Associate Professor of Computer
Science, Princeton University).
86
See Menell, supra note 31, at 178-79. The most embarrassing illustration that
every lock can be picked is the faltering of the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI).
The SDMI held a competition for hackers, testing their ability to crack the latest anticircumvention technology, the digital watermark. Edward Felten, an expert in computer science, accepted the offer and successfully cracked the protection technology.
He drafted his findings in a paper that he planned to present until he was threatened
with a lawsuit by the SDMI. Felten fired back with his own lawsuit requesting a declaratory judgment, which was subsequently dismissed. Felten finally went forward with the
presentation of his paper after he received assurance from the Justice Department that
the threats of a DMCA violation were invalid. See FISHER, supra note 9, at 96-97.
87
See, e.g., Press Release, Steve Jobs, Apple Inc., Thoughts on Music (Feb. 6, 2007),
available at http://www.apple.com/hotnews/thoughtsonmusic (“It is a cat-and-mouse
game.”); see also Lee Kovarsky, A Technological Theory of the Arms Race, 81 IND. L.J. 917,
932-37 (2006) (exploring the relationship between the technological arms race and
copyright law and addressing the options available to content providers who wish to
exclude consumers from their expressive assets).
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further polarization between the two camps. Uncertainty and delay
provide fertile ground for the politically charged environment in
copyright law.
C. Copyright and Congress
Given the fast-changing and unpredictable nature of technology,
courts are sometimes confronted with legal disputes about technology
that has not fully matured. In those instances, judges may not always
feel comfortable providing a final judgment, given the ambiguous
88
copyright implications of the developing technology. It might simply
be too difficult for the judge to align the goals of copyright law with
an emerging technology, particularly if the social and economic repercussions are not fully clear. There is also the chance that a premature ruling may adversely interfere with the development of the tech89
nology. For that reason, courts may defer judgment on the copyright
status of new technology. Although courts are compelled by law to
provide judgment in every case, there are various ways in which courts
can decide a dispute while reserving judgment on the broader issue.
For instance, a judge can limit the reach of the ruling by reducing the
scope of the holding or limiting the breadth of the ruling.
As indicated in the previous Section, courts frequently defer their
decisions on the copyright status of new technology by including language that transfers accountability to the legislature. The standard
formulation of this disposition appears in the Supreme Court’s opin90
ion in Sony-Betamax. The Court spoke quite clearly about Congress’s
role in applying copyright law to new technology: “The direction of
Art. I is that Congress shall have the power to promote the progress of
science and the useful arts. When, as here, the Constitution is permissive, the sign of how far Congress has chosen to go can come only from

88

See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“The history of the Internet is a chronicle of innovation by improvisation, from its
genesis as a national defense research network, to a medium of academic exchange, to
a hacker cyber-subculture, to the commercial engine for the so-called ‘New Economy.’
Like Heraclitus at the river, we address the Internet aware that courts are ill-suited to
fix its flow . . . .”).
89
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 955
(2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (observing the importance of permitting software with
substantial noninfringing uses for the protection of the development of technology).
90
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1983).
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91

Congress.” Similarly, the Court’s decision in Grokster illustrates an example of judicial deference in copyright law. In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer perhaps best formulated the position in favor of judicial deference in copyright law: “[A]s Sony recognized, the legislative
option remains available. Courts are less well suited than Congress to
the task of ‘accommodat[ing] fully the varied permutations of compet92
ing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new technology.’”
By inducing judicial deference, technological uncertainty thus
contributes to the significant level of legislative rulemaking in copyright law. Empirical evidence supports the notion that legislative
rulemaking in copyright law is more prevalent than judicial decision
making. For instance, a study conducted by William Landes and
Richard Posner concludes that the history of copyright law includes
more legislative changes than does any other field of intellectual
93
It also found that the average length of legislative
property law.
documents in copyright law is substantially longer than that of similar
acts in other areas of intellectual property law. In a recent study,
Clarisa Long similarly discovered that legislative activity, measured
over a range of indicators such as the number of amicus briefs, is
94
more intense in copyright law than other fields.
The fact that legislative rulemaking overshadows judicial lawmaking in copyright may have particular significance for the shaping of
copyright law over time. Consider the following four effects of judicial
deference on the evolution of copyright law.
First, because legislative and judicial institutions rely on different
principles and procedures, legislative outcomes are often likely to be
different from judicial ones. While legislative drafting is a democratic
process that ideally weighs various constituents’ interests against the
social and economic purposes of the prospective rule, judicial rulemaking is more strongly beholden to its own prior judgments through
judicial precedent.
Second, and perhaps most salient, an emphasis on legislative
rulemaking opens the door to greater influence by interest groups. In
a legislative framework, financially strong repeat players are able to
91

Id. at 456 (quoting Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530
(1972)).
92
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 965 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 431).
93
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 2-3 (2004).
94
Clarisa Long, Political Economy of Intellectual Property Law (2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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organize lobbying efforts more effectively, while judicial lawmaking,
although not entirely immune to organized influence, is more insu95
lated from the organized action of interest groups. Indeed, there is
some consensus among scholars that legislative decision making in
copyright law disproportionately reflects the interests of those who are
able to organize and lobby Congress most effectively—the entertainment industry. By this account, technological uncertainty might provide another explanation for the amount of legislative activity in copyright law and the consequences thereof.
Third, judicial deference to legislative decision making in copyright law has an effect on the timing of lawmaking and, consequently,
on the duration of legal uncertainty. Deference to the legislature not
only postpones decision making to a later point in time but also places
the final resolution of a copyright issue in the lap of a slower rulemaker. Although both legislative and judicial decision making involve
elaborate procedural safeguards, legislative decision making, by the
nature of its democratic processes, involves more deliberation and,
95

The rationale is that judges, especially those not subject to election, are influenced less by considerations unrelated to the substance of the litigation. Some commentators have argued that judge-made law provides more efficient outcomes because
inefficient legal decisions are more likely to induce repeat litigation than efficient outcomes. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 251-52 (4th ed. 1992)
(noting that common law doctrines “form a system for inducing people to behave efficiently, not only in explicit markets but across the whole range of social interactions”);
Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 51 (1977)
(“[E]fficient rules may evolve from in-court settlement, thereby reducing the incentive
for future litigation and increasing the probability that efficient rules will persist.”). But
see George L. Priest, Selective Characteristics of Litigation, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 410 (1980)
(contesting the ability of “the efficiency standard to explain all common law decisions”
by considering the impact of settlements); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (1984) (noting that Posner’s conclusion on common law efficiency “requires the presumption that there are no cases involving alternate liability standards that were settled prior to appeal”). Others have argued,
however, that the comparative advantage of judge-made law is somewhat exaggerated.
As with legislation, litigation can be manipulated by those with a greater financial interest and long-standing experience. As such, well-organized interest groups can more efficiently organize and pool litigation efforts, and they can also rely on prior experiences
to make strategic decisions to settle disputes unlikely to result in favorable judicial
precedents. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97-104 (1974) (discussing the advantage that
repeat legal players have over “one-shotters”); Paul H. Rubin & Martin J. Bailey, The Role
of Lawyers in Changing the Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 807, 807 (1994) (“[T]he law is driven
by the preferences of attorneys, not of litigants or of judges . . . .”); Todd J. Zywicki, The
Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
1551, 1553 (2003) (“[C]hanges in [the] institutional framework have made the common law more susceptible to rent-seeking pressures, which have undermined the common law’s pro-efficiency orientation.”).
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ideally, the consultation of a wide range of stakeholders. Legislative
decision making might also be further delayed because of politically
strategic reasons or because of difficulties in reaching a consensus between various stakeholders.
Finally, it is important to note that, by prolonging legal uncertainty,
judicial deference allows the behavioral effects discussed in the previous
two Sections—users’ anticopyright norms’ becoming internalized and
content holders’ resorting to self-help efforts—to be reinforced.
III. UNCERTAINTY, DELAY, AND COPYRIGHT REFORM
Until now, this Article has made a modest attempt at explaining
several recurring patterns in the evolution of copyright law. In the
remainder of this Article, I provide a number of normative reflections.
A. Evaluating Uncertainty and Delay
96

Uncertainty and legal delay impose significant social costs. Some
individuals may overestimate the legal constraints and forego activities
that the state seeks to encourage, while others may underestimate the
very same constraints and engage in undesirable behavior. A lack of
certainty may also induce copyright holders to engage in aggressive
97
litigation strategies. For instance, “if the legal standard is uncertain,
even actors who attempt to act ‘optimally’ in terms of overall social
welfare will face some chance of being held liable because of the un98
predictability of the legal rule.” Risk-averse individuals may react by
overcomplying—that is, by modifying their behavior beyond the point
99
that is socially optimal. In the context of copyright law, overcompli96

Although I do not focus on this issue, legal uncertainty often has redistributive
effects. See Uri Weiss, The Regressive Effect of Legal Uncertainty 1 (Tel Aviv Univ. L. Sch.
Faculty Papers, Paper No. 30, 2005), available at http://law.bepress.com/taulwps/
fp/art30 (“[A] shift from a certainty legal regime to an uncertainty legal regime transfers wealth from risk-averse parties to risk-neutral parties via the settlement.”).
97
Generally, by increasing potential disagreement over the outcome, greater uncertainty reduces settlement rates. See Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 58, at 265. For a
concise but insightful overview of the pernicious effect of uncertainty in the context of
fair use, see R. Polk Wagner, The Perfect Storm: Intellectual Property and Public Values, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 429-31 (2005).
98
Calfee & Craswell supra note 67, at 966.
99
Examples in the literature on overcompliance induced by uncertain application
of legal standards include commentary on labor regulation and tax compliance. See
Debra D. Burke, Workplace Harassment: A Proposal for a Bright Line Test Consistent with the
First Amendment, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 591, 605 (2004) (“Risk-averse employers’
natural reaction to the vague limits of hostile environment is to over-compensate by
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ance may have a chilling effect on creativity and authorship. Artists
will avoid incorporating copyrighted materials into their creative
works even when incorporating those particular works could well be
100
considered to be fair use and noninfringing.
In other instances, uncertainty may undermine deterrence. Uncertain conditions loosen the connection between behavior and enforcement. When the chance of getting caught for certain behavior
becomes more remote, individuals may decide to take the underlying
action. In this sense, legal uncertainty may create the tipping point
towards noncompliance in environments where there is a low probability of enforcement, as in the case of file sharing on peer-to-peer
101
networks.
Another potential cost of legal uncertainty is that, by enabling self102
serving dispositions, uncertainty drives copyright stakeholders into
entrenched positions, making it more difficult to reach political conprohibiting words or conduct in the workplace that even come close to bordering on
harassment.”); Ehud Kamar, Shareholder Litigation Under Indeterminate Corporate Law, 66
U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 889 (1999) (“[L]egal indeterminacy creates liability risk, which riskaverse fiduciaries are in a poor position to bear. Exposing corporate fiduciaries to this
risk makes their services more costly and less productive to shareholders.”); Kyle D.
Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX REV. 339, 373 (2005)
(“Legal uncertainty can induce taxpayers, especially risk-averse taxpayers, to overcomply with the law in various ways[,] . . . such as changing the structure of their transactions, deciding not to engage in the transaction in question, or engaging the transaction as planned but without taking advantage of the more favorable tax treatment to
which they are arguably . . . entitled.”). Note that, when overdeterrence is not a concern, some authors have argued that uncertainty can be beneficial by inducing negotiated solutions or by increasing efficiency in law enforcement efforts. See, e.g., Tom
Baker et al., The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV.
443, 445 (2004) (“[U]ncertain sanctions may be preferable on efficiency grounds because they achieve more deterrence than certain sanctions of the same expected
value.”); Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, The Vagueness of Limits and the Desired Distribution of
Conducts, 32 CONN. L. REV. 451 (2000) (arguing that vague rules should be preferred
over precise rules because they allow “customized compliance”); Linda K. Thomas, Child
Custody, Community And Autonomy: The Ties That Bind?, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S
STUD. 645 (1997) (examining the vague “best interest” test used in determining child
custody and how the standard causes more private ordering due to its uncertainty).
100
For example, documentary artists sometimes avoid including any copyrighted
materials, even something as remote as a ringtone in the background of a scene. See
Nancy Ramsey, The Secret Cost of Documentaries, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, § 2, at 13.
101
See Henrik Lando, Does Wrongful Conviction Lower Deterrence?, 35 J. LEGAL STUD.
327, 334-35 (2006); see also Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain
Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279, 299 (1986). Evidence from cognitive psychology suggests that low-risk events are generally either grossly overweighed or neglected altogether. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames,
39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 345 (1984).
102
See supra Section II.A.
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sensus in copyright issues. This entrenchment can be a good or a bad
thing, depending on one’s normative viewpoint on copyright law. If
one adheres to the view that copyright law disproportionally reflects
the interests of copyright holders, the amplifying effect of uncertainty
and delay on procopy norms and anticopyright social mobilization
provides some counterweight to the political pressure exerted by copyright industries. If, on the other hand, one takes the viewpoint of the
entertainment industry that digital technology and file sharing are
eroding the much-needed protection of copyright holders, then reducing legal delay and uncertainty holds the promise of reducing the
creation and internalization of self-serving social norms that disregard
copyright infringements. Reducing uncertainty and delay may also
reduce costly protective measures, such as technological self-help, re103
medial litigation, and political rent-seeking expenditures.
Finally, note that copyright holders and users of new technology
sometimes strategically employ the conditions of uncertainty and delay. For instance, by settling cases, copyright owners can intentionally
delay unfavorable legal decisions on new technology (for instance, if a
finding of fair use with regard to a new technology is likely). Similarly, for representatives of new technologies, it can be useful to prolong periods of uncertainty, as those periods leave more time for users
of new technology to begin to incorporate the new technology into
their everyday lives and to entrench the norm of free content in the
104
public’s perception.
Overall then, the attendant costs and distortions that are induced
by uncertainty and delay raise the question whether there are ways to
reduce legal delay and uncertainty.
B. Reducing Uncertainty and Delay
To a certain degree, as this Article shows, uncertainty and delay
105
are inevitable byproducts of a rapidly changing environment.
The

103

See supra Sections II.B-C.
See, e.g., Steven Hetcher, Using Social Norms to Regulate Fan Fiction and Remix Culture, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1880-84 (2009) (discussing the emergence of a norm of
socially acceptable digital remixing of copyrighted content against a background of
legal uncertainty).
105
In fact, some scholars suggest that several factors in the legal process create a
trend of increasing uncertainty in law over time. See, e.g., D’Amato, supra note 56, at 5
(arguing that exceptions and nuances in judicial interpretation and specialized legislation create a trend towards greater complexity); Hirsch, supra note 58, at 1245-48 (arguing that the conflicting objectives of lawmakers and courts obstruct the preference for
104
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difficulty of anticipating coming and (ever-changing) technological
trends complicates efforts to anticipate and quickly adopt copyright
rules. Similarly, detailed interpretations of existing rules are complicated by the ever-changing nature of technological applications of
copyrighted content. There is a permanent risk that a premature legal intervention will distort innovative activities. While respectful of
the inherent limitations of this endeavor, the remainder of this Part
explores a number of institutional possibilities that might reduce the
lag between innovation and legal certainty regarding the copyright
status of a new technology. What initiatives can one undertake to reduce uncertainty and delay?
C. Copyright Rules or Standards?
Many important aspects of copyright law are governed by stan106
dards rather than rules. Open-ended standards—fair use being the
most important example—increase the amount of decision making at
107
the judicial level. As such, copyright law’s use of standards may congreater certainty); Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures,
42 DUKE L.J. 1 (1992) (arguing that legal professionals benefit from legal complexity).
106
On the distinction between rules and standards, consider the following:
Legal norms can be precise rules, which are blueprints for action and allow
for mechanical decisions by judges and civil servants. Alternatively, they can
be vague, mission-oriented standards, which delegate decisions from the
maker of the law to the judiciary and the administration. Rules economize on
the costs of adjudication and administration. Standards economize on the
costs of norm specification.
Hans-Bernd Schäfer, Rules Versus Standards in Rich and Poor Countries: Precise Legal
Norms as Substitutes for Human Capital in Low-Income Countries, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV.
113, 113 (2006). There is not a binary distinction between the two categories. Rather,
“[t]he difference between a rule and a standard is a matter of degree—the degree of
precision.” Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 58, at 258. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Pierre Schlag, Rules
and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985).
107
The statutory language governing fair use speaks in broad generalities:
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a
fair use the factors to be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
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tribute to the existing levels of legal delay and uncertainty. Perhaps
legal uncertainty and delay in copyright law can be reduced by employing more precise rules. By reducing judicial discretion, potential
ambiguities regarding the interpretation of existing rules, as they apply to new technologies, are narrowed. This option would obviously
reduce uncertainty as to the application of existing law to new technology. By reducing the breadth of interpretative opportunities, precise rules also reduce the number of instances where delay is a factor.
A number of recent proposals have advocated the use of bright-line
rules to reduce uncertainty in copyright law, particularly with regard
108
to the application of the fair use doctrine. For example, in an interesting proposal, Gideon Parchomovsky and Kevin Goldman suggest
109
the creation of statutory minimal safe harbors in copyright law. Explicit statements of quantifiable permitted uses promote clear and
110
predictable outcomes.
While the insights of this Article favor the adoption of bright-line
rules over open-ended standards, it is necessary to be mindful of the
limits of taking copyright law in this direction. To some degree, the
unpredictable nature of technology simply necessitates open-ended
111
standards in copyright law. There are at least two major arguments
in favor of the adoption of standards in copyright law. First, narrowly
tailored rules are likely to increase error costs. In an unpredictable,
fast-changing technological landscape, new innovations often do not

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
108
See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 295 (2004) (advocating clearer and narrower lines demarcating the scope of protection for derivative works); Joseph P. Liu,
Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 151-52 (2004) (suggesting that the Copyright
Office could be given the regulatory authority to promulgate rules and safe harbors).
For an interesting account of the potential harms of fair use, see generally Rebecca
Tushnet, Essay, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying
Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004).
109
Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV.
1483, 1489 (2007).
110
See id. at 1511 (“We propose that for any literary work consisting of at least one
hundred words, the lesser of fifteen percent or three hundred words may be copied
without the permission of the copyright holder.”).
111
Several scholars have argued that a flexible fair use analysis is necessary. See,
e.g., Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 140 (1999)
(“The ‘muddy’ four-part balancing standard of fair use allows courts to reallocate what
the market cannot.”); Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087 (2007)
(arguing that fair use is sensitive to context); Matthew Sag, God in the Machine: A New
Structural Analysis of Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
381, 435 (2005) (noting that a flexible fair use standard allows courts to adapt copyright protection to new innovations).
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fit within existing concepts and definitions. Consider, for instance,
the introduction of the VCR. While private recordings of cable TV
shows plainly violated the exclusive right of copyright holders to make
copies, the flexibility of the fair use standard enabled courts to exempt the time-shifting features of VCR recorders. By allowing the record function to be maintained on VCR players, the fair use exemption arguably boosted the success of VCR technology, which eventually
created a very profitable secondary market in the sale of VHS tapes
and rental movies. The fact that VCR technology, with its dual-use
character, eventually boosted the revenues of copyright holders
plainly illustrates the highly unpredictable nature of the social and
economic ramifications of technology.
Second, flexible and open-ended standards are better suited to
handle responses from technological innovators in regards to the legal rules. Technological developers are notoriously apt at what Leo
112
Developers create technological
Katz has termed legal “avoision.”
applications that do not violate legal rules sensu strictu but that defeat
the very purpose of those rules. Whenever legislation or precedent
provides specific language in the copyright statute that speaks to a
new technology, technological innovators develop novel applications
that exploit the gaps between technological possibilities and the self113
described boundaries of law. For example, when the Ninth Circuit
in Napster established that copyright law implicates developers of centralized peer-to-peer technology by way of contributory liability, developers of file-sharing technology developed decentralized peer-to-peer
file-sharing applications that were functionally equivalent to those ex114
By removing central
plicitly prohibited in the Napster decision.
servers, which gave rise to contributory liability on behalf of software
developers, the developers successfully evaded the legal rule created
in Napster. Bright-line rules are thus easier for developers to circum-

112

LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS 17-30 (1996) (contrasting “avoision” of ethical
rules with “avoision” of law).
113
Such interaction between law and technology can perhaps best be compared to
the adaptation of creative tax consultants to the Internal Revenue Service. See Tim Wu,
When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 682 (2003) (“The programmer is not unlike
the tax lawyer, exploiting differences between stated goals of the law, and its legal or
practical limits. He targets specific weaknesses in legal regimes . . . .”).
114
See, e.g., Kristina Groennings, Costs and Benefits of the Recording Industry’s Litigation Against Individuals, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 571, 573 (2005) (“The [recording] industry’s victory in Napster was fleeting as publicity over the issue increased awareness of
P2P technology and users flocked to decentralized networks like Grokster and KaZaa,
making the tracking of P2P use more difficult.” (footnotes omitted)).
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vent, as the developers can create new adaptive technology that does
not fit within the existing rule. The lack of analogy between the new
technology and the existing legal rules will necessitate the creation of
new substantive rules. Open standards, of course, also create ambiguity as to the applicability of the existing rule to a newly designed technology. It can be argued, however, that when applying standards,
such ambiguities can be resolved more easily by lower courts, while
the adaptation of specific rules requires the creation of a new legal regime—the latter being a more time-consuming process.
D. Copyright Courts or Administrative Agencies?
Both delay and uncertainty are increased by the slow response of
courts and are amplified further whenever courts defer decision making to Congress. This problem raises issues of comparative institutional
design. Perhaps there is some promise in delegating copyright governance to decision makers that are capable of acting more swiftly and effectively, thereby reducing overall levels of legal uncertainty and delay.
How do we begin to assess the effects of judicial deference and
congressional involvement? Scholarly commentary generally deplores
the expansion of copyright law that resulted from legislative action.
This Article raises separate concerns related to the higher levels of
uncertainty and delay that result from judicial deference. In a legislative framework, copyright law is more likely to preserve the status quo
because political compromise is so difficult to reach. Indeed, the political landscape surrounding copyright law has reached a state of significant polarization. New technological advances have increased the
115
stakes in copyright, enhancing the incentive to organize effectively.
Moreover, the Internet enables interest groups that oppose the expansion of intellectual property rights to organize themselves at lower
cost, creating competition with larger, better-funded interests. The
various positions taken by library associations, social-freedom groups,
open-software movements, consumer-protection groups, artists’ rights
groups, civil libertarians, the digital-freedom movement, the academic
community, industry, and others makes political compromise harder
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The work of Lawrence Lessig in particular rests upon the notion that cyberspace is a “fundamentally important changed circumstance” in the traditional copyright equation. Because cyberspace makes the public domain so readily accessible, the
stakes are raised to keep copyrighted material flowing into the public domain. See
Linda Greenhouse, Justices Hear Arguments on Extension of Copyrights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10,
2002, at C1.
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to attain. Thus, the more active political field may be slowing down
legislative decision making in copyright. Of course, legislative inertia
may be preferable to those who disparage the expansionary direction
of copyright law over the past century. But, by extending uncertainty
and delay, legislative inertia simply delays the resolution of new issues
in copyright law. This delay increases the familiar social costs de116
Interestingly, legislative inertia also may have a selfscribed above.
sustaining effect. Given the enabling effects of uncertainty on anticopyright norms and self-help, legal inertia might lead to further polarization, making political compromise even harder to attain.
The objective of reducing uncertainty and delay strengthens the
case for regulatory approaches to copyright law. There are a number
of arguments that support delegating the administration of novel
copyright issues to new regulatory bodies. First, administrative bodies
might be better suited to resolve politically entrenched stalemates in
copyright. In this sense, commentators have analogized the political
and technological developments surrounding copyright law to developments in environmental issues since the 1960s. Political theory
suggests that “conflictual demand patterns” for new legislation, as observed in copyright today, are more conducive to outcomes in which
Congress delegates resolution of the problem to regulatory agen117
If isolated from political pressure, regulatory agencies might
cies.
118
be better positioned to balance the “competing core principles” in
copyright law without discouraging the creation and dissemination of
new technologies.
Second, technocratic regulatory agencies might be better
equipped to handle the growing complexity of technologies and the
high rate of technological innovation. As Peter Menell notes, “regulating digital devices in the name of content protection hinders progress of digital technology. Similarly, in environmental policy, legislators came to see that pollution controls could impair economic
119
growth.” In this sense, regulation provides a means to balance competing goals. As such, regulatory bodies are often able to respond
more proactively to issues involving the implementation of complex
technological standards and to address copyright-related issues involving the application of the technology.

116
117
118
119

See supra Section III.A.
See Menell, supra note 31, at 195.
Id. at 196.
See id. at 197.
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Third, some of the instruments available to regulators might be of
particular assistance to the case at hand. For instance, one possible inroad to reducing uncertainty and delay could involve the issuing of
agency guidelines that set an explicit understanding of new technology
and align the expectations of the copyright implications involved. Although such guidelines might not contain any definite resolution of
copyright issues, they might moderate the overextended reactions of
copyright stakeholders that are amplified by legal uncertainty. Moreover, guidelines could set default positions that might preempt some of
the expectations of free use of new technologies that are a major source
of the resentment that produces anticopyright norms whenever a new
technology is found to be infringing at a later stage.
Surely, regulatory involvement imposes costs and requires oversight. From the perspective of reducing uncertainty and delay, however, there is ample reason to seriously consider recent proposals to
adopt regulatory approaches as a more prevalent mode of governing
copyright law in the future.
CONCLUSION
This Article examines the relationship between technology and
copyright law. Specifically, it explores the formative effects of technological innovation on copyright law. To construct this argument, I examine the formative roles of legal uncertainty and legal delay—two
baseline characteristics of a rapidly changing and highly unpredictable technological landscape. I argue that uncertainty and delay have
an enabling effect on anticopyright sentiments, provoke a greater reliance on self-help efforts by content providers and users, and induce
legislative involvement in the area of copyright law.
Together, legal uncertainty and delay present interrelated complications that inhibit the enforcement of copyright law: anticopying
technology never accomplishes perfect protection, social norms complicate enforcement efforts, and legal adaptation is slow. An analysis
of these intrinsic constraints provides an improved understanding of
the enforcement problems faced by copyright law.
Copyright enforcement is, and always has been, imperfect. Recent
technological advancements, such as file-swapping technology and
peer-to-peer networks, plainly highlight the practical limits to the enforcement of copyright law. We should understand the actions of
copyright stakeholders for what they are: natural responses of actors
facing legal uncertainty in a fast-changing technological environment.
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Understanding these patterns can guard against exaggerated responses. At the same time, insight into the dynamics of copyright
change provides opportunities to make modest institutional improvements that may ameliorate some of the social costs imposed by
the current copyright divide.

